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Constitutional Propriety of State Judges' Inquiries
into the Numerical Division of Deadlocked Juries:
Ellis v. Reed
Bruce Ellis was convicted of embezzlement by a North Car-
olina trial court.' During the jury deliberations, the judge had
asked the jury to reveal its numerical division.2 After Ellis' di-
rect appeals failed,3 he sought a writ of habeas corpus 4 in fed-
eral district court, alleging as errors both the trial judge's
inquiry into the numerical division of the jury and the judge's
use of a modified Allen charge as a. supplemental jury instruc-
tion.5 Finding no error, the federal district court denied the
1. The trial court found Ellis guilty of embezzling $18,799.50 from a finance
company. Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195, 1196 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 468
(1979).
2. Id. See note 5 infra.
3. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the record.
State v. Ellis, 33 N.C. App. 667, 673, 236 S.E.2d 299, 304 (1977). However, the ap-
pellant did not assign as error the inquiry into the division of the jury. Ellis v.
Reed, 596 F.2d 1195, 1197 n.2 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 468 (1979). The
Supreme Court of North Carolina denied discretionary review. State v. Ellis,
293 N.C. 255, 236 S.E.2d 708 (1977).
4. The writ of habeas corpus tests "the legality of the detention of one in
the custody of another." McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934). A federal
judge may grant the writ, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1976), "in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976).
5. The Allen charge received its name from Allen v. United States, 164
U.S. 492 (1896). In that case, the Supreme Court approved a supplemental in-
struction given to a deadlocked jury, an instruction that urged the jury to de-
cide the case if possible and emphasized the duty of the minority jurors to
reconsider their position in light of the majority's viewpoint. Id. at 501-02.
Following the three-day trial in Ellis, the jury deliberated for approxi-
mately one hour before returning to the courtroom for additional instructions.
After a second hour of deliberation, the jury again returned to the courtroom,
and the following dialogue occurred.
COURT: Mr. Foreman, have you reached a verdict?
JURY FOREMAN: No, Your Honor, we have not.
COURT: Will you tell me numerically what is the division; not
what each of you were, but the numerical division.
JURY FOREMAN: Eleven to one.
COURT: Well, I presume, ladies and gentlemen, that you realize
what a disagreement means; that the time of the Court will again have
to be consumed in the trial of this action. I don't want to force you or
coerce you or attempt to do so in any way to reach a verdict but it is
your duty to try to reconcile your differences and to reach a verdict if it
can be done without the surrender of anyone's conscientious convic-
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writ.6 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
holding that judicial inquiry into the division of the jury is not
constitutionally prohibited7 and that the totality of the circum-
stances, including the judicial inquiry, did not violate the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial.8 Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 468 (1979).
Under the sixth amendment, defendants in federal criminal
cases enjoy a right to trial by an impartial jury.9 In Duncan v.
Louisiana,0 the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to a trial
by jury to defendants in state criminal cases."1 Even before
Duncan, the Court interpreted the due process clause to re-
quire that any state jury trial be a fair trial before an impartial
jury.12 The Court, however, has never determined whether an
inquiry into the division of a jury violates this constitutional
right. In the 1905 case of Burton v. United States,'3 the Court
condemned the practice of inquiring into the numerical divi-
tions; and you heard the evidence in this case, and a mistrial will mean
that another jury will have to be selected to hear this case and the evi-
dence again; and it's long and complicated. The Court recognizes
sometimes that there are reasons why jurors cannot agree, but I want
to emphasize the fact that it is your duty to do whatever you can to
reason this matter over as reasonable men and women and attempt to
reconcile your differences if it is possible without the surrender of any
conscientious convictions on the part of any member of the jury. I will
let you resume your deliberations and see if you can reach a verdict.
Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195, 1196 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 468 (1979).
The jury then reached a verdict of guilty within eight minutes. Id.
6. Ellis v. Reed, No. 77-392-HC (E.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 1978), reprinted in Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari app., at I, Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 468 (1979).
7. 596 F.2d at 1197. The court was apparently referring to the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, as applied to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. See note 51 infra.
8. 596 F.2d at 1200. If the inquiry or the totality of the circumstances co-
erces a juror, the defendant would not receive an impartial trial, guaranteed by
the sixth amendment, as applied to the states by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See notes 51, 58 infra.
9. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed ...... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
11. Id. at 149.
12. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) ("Due process re-
quires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences."); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) ("[T]he right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indif-
ferent' jurors."); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."); Note, Due Process, Judicial
Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L
REv. 123, 138-41 (1967).
13. 196 U.S. 283 (1905).
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sion of a federal jury, since "cases may easily be imagined
where a practice of this kind might lead to improper influ-
ences."1 4 Twenty years later, the Court ended the disagree-
ment over the significance of the Burton language15 by holding
in Brasfield v. United States'6 that any such inquiry constituted
reversible error.
We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial,
that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Such
procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by ques-
tions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its divi-
sion. Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon
circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to
the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but in
general its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without
bringing to bear in some degree, serious although not measurable, an
improper influence upon the jury, from whose deliberations every con-
sideration other than that of the evidence and the law as expounded in
a proper charge, should be excluded. Such a practice, which is never
useful and is generally harmful, is not to be sanctioned.
1 7
The Brasfield Court did not indicate whether the rule it was
adopting was a constitutional prohibition or an exercise of its
supervisory powers over the federal courts,' 8 nor has the Court
subsequently clarified the basis of its decision in Brasfield.'9
Although federal courts are bound by the result in Bras-
field (even if that result derives from the Supreme Court's su-
pervisory powers), application of the holding in Brasfield has
sometimes been difficult because of the ambiguity in that opin-
14. Id. at 307-08 (dictum).
15. After the decision in Burton, the circuit courts of appeals disagreed as
to whether the condemnation of the inquiry was mandatory or hortatory. See
Jordan v. United States, 22 F.2d 966, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1927) (Gilbert, J., dissent-
ing), and cases cited therein.
16. 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
17. Id. at 450. In Brasfield, after the jury had deliberated several hours
without reaching a verdict, the trial judge inquired about its numerical division.
The foreman reported that the division was nine to three, without indicating
whether the majority or minority favored conviction. Id. at 449.
18. The "supervisory power" first appeared as an independent basis of de-
cision in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Courts have used the
supervisory power to maintain "civilized standards" of judicial administration,
id. at 340, and to raise those standards higher than the minimum constitutional
requirements of due process. In a habeas corpus action arising from a state
criminal prosecution, however, the federal court can apply only the constitu-
tional standard. See, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). See gener-
ally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUm. L. REV. 181,
193-213 (1969); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts,
53 GEO. LJ. 1050 (1965); Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76
HARv. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
19. See Virgin Islands v. Romain, 600 F.2d 435, 437 (3d Cir. 1979).
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ion. With few exceptions, 20 federal courts prohibit inquiries. 21
Occasionally these courts extend Brasfield beyond its facts to
require reversal when the trial judge merely asks for the ap-
proximate division of the jury.2 2 Other federal courts, dis-
tinguishing Brasfield, find no error when the jury voluntarily
reveals its numerical division to the trial judge.23 Even the sta-
20. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that an inquiry
that revealed the jurors to be "pretty evenly divided" was permissible because
without a minority to coerce there could be no coercive effect. Anderson v.
United States, 262 F.2d 764, 773 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 929 (1959). On
two occasions, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that inquiry for the
purpose of arranging a suitable recess for a meal for the jurors was not revers-
ible error since the error did not affect substantial rights. Beale v. United
States, 263 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1959); Butler v. United States, 254 F.2d 875, 876
(5th Cir. 1958). Both opinions applied the harmless error rule from the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. Camx. P. 52(a).
21. See Virgin Islands v. Romain, 600 F.2d 435, 436 (3d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303, 1304 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hayes, 446
F.2d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1971); Jacobs v. United States, 279 F.2d 826, 832 (8th Cir.
1960); Cook v. United States, 254 F.2d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v.
Samuel Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1949); Spaugh v. United
States, 77 F.2d 720, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1935); Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438,
439 (10th Cir. 1932); Jordan v. United States, 22 F.2d 966, 967 (9th Cir. 1927).
Other courts have recognized the rule, but distinguished on its facts the case
under consideration. United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 331 n.8 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Smoot, 463 F.2d 1221, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States
v. Mack, 249 F.2d 321, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 920 (1958);
Cenedella v. United States, 224 F.2d 778, 784 (lst Cir. 1955); State v. Collins, 10
F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1935). Interpreting Brasfield, Devitt and Black-
mar state, "[I]t is a cardinal rule that the court should not ask the jury as to
their numerical division. This is ground for reversal." J. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 5.22, at 161-62 (3d ed. 1977).
Commentators have criticized the Brasfield rule. See L. OREELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 467 (1947); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2350,
at 692 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); 16 CAL. L. REV. 325, 327 (1928); 27 CoLuM. L.
REv. 756, 757 (1927); 41 HARv. L. REv., 797, 797-98 (1928); 25 MICH. L REv. 687, 687
(1927); 76 U. PA. L. REV. 622, 623 (1928); 3 VAND. L. REV. 123, 123-25 (1949). Even
federal judges who have followed the rule have expressed their dislike of it:
We are bound to say that we do not feel happy over the result, for
here the defendants appear to have had the benefit of the most careful
deliberation by the jury and it is certainly doubtful whether in fact the
judge's remarks may have had any effect in restricting or controlling
that deliberation. Here was a long and difficult trial, where the evi-
dence of guilt was substantial, now upset after a seven weeks' effort for
this one perhaps doubtful slip. The defendants, out on bail, have al-
ready had the benefit of extreme delay in making up the record and
preparing the appeal. This case does not make for seemly law admin-
stration. But the federal precedents are compelling.
United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1949).
22. Jacobs v. United States, 279 F.2d 826, 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1960) (judicial
inquiry whether division is equal or largely one-sided); United States v. Samuel
Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506, 507, 510 (2d Cir. 1949) (judicial inquiry whether there
is a majority and a minority); Jordan v. United States, 22 F.2d 966, 966-67 (9th
Cir. 1927) (judicial inquiry whether jury is about evenly divided).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
United States v. Zeehandelaar, 498 F.2d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
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tus of Brasfield as a per se rule against inquiries, however, is
not beyond question. Many appellate courts have discussed
the coercive effect of a circumstance other than the inquiry
before reversing the conviction.24 This broad analysis makes it
difficult to ascertain whether these courts would hold that an
inquiry by itself constitutes reversible error. Brasfield provides
no guidance on this issue, because it involved both an inquiry
and a possibly coercive Allen charge.25
State courts have been less willing than federal courts to
follow the Brasfield rule and have taken three different ap-
proaches to the issue of judicial inquiries. Courts of three ju-
risdictions treat an inquiry alone as a ground for reversal,2 6 and
Jennings, 471 F.2d 1310, 1314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935 (1973); United
States v. Williams, 444 F.2d 108, 109 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Meyers, 410
F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969); Bowen v. United States,
153 F.2d 747, 752 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303, 1304 (9th Cir. 1979) (dis-
cussing the fact that during the first of two inquiries, defendants and attorneys
were not present); Cook v. United States, 254 F.2d 871, 873-75 (5th Cir. 1959)
(discussing the aggravation of the inquiry by the suggestion that the jury might
be held together over the weekend).
25. Although the trial judge in the Brasfield case gave an Allen charge af-
ter inquiring into the division of the jury, Brasfield v. United States, 8 F.2d 472,
472 (9th Cir. 1925), rev'd, 272 U.S. 448 (1926), the Supreme Court opinion does
not discuss that charge. In each of the cases cited in Brasfield, an instruction
on the duty to reach agreement followed the inquiry. For a discussion of those
cases, see Jordan v. United States, 22 F.2d 966, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1927) (Gilbert, J.,
dissenting).
26. Michigan. People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193 (1973), af"g
People v. Wilson, 44 Mich. App. 137, 205 N.W.2d 75 (1972). But see People v.
Lawson, 56 Mich. App. 100, 105, 223 N.W.2d 716, 719 (1974) (stating that the
Michigan Supreme Court in Wilson did not clearly indicate whether inquiry
was reversible error under all circumstances).
New Mexico. State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976). The New Mexico Supreme Court has not
decided the issue.
Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 102 Pa. Super. Ct. 46, 156 A. 582
(1931); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 91 Pa. Super. Ct. 518 (1927); Commonwealth
v. McCain, 39 Delaware County 331 (Pa. 1952). Contra, Commonwealth v. Bel-
lino, 44 Delaware County 285, 71 York Legal Rec. 107 (Pa. 1957) (inquiry not er-
ror in the absence of coercion of the jury). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has not decided the issue.
The Ellis opinion also cites Taylor v. State, 17 Md. App. 41, 299 A.2d 841
(1973), and Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975), as cases in which state
courts have adhered to Brasfield. 596 F.2d at 1198. It would be more accurate,
however, to describe these cases as having considered the totality of the cir-
cumstances. While Taylor suggests that Brasfield is a constitutional rule, 17
Md. App. at 49 n.8, 299 A.2d at 845 n.8, the judicial conduct in Taylor did not
include an inquiry. Part of the coercive conduct was the agreement of the
judge with one juror, after a voluntary disclosure that the division was eleven
to one, that "[ilt's up to the one to change." Id. at 44, 299 A.2d at 844. See also
Smoot v. State, 31 Md. App. 138, 355 A.2d 495 (1976) (no inquiry; judicial con-
duct coercive in totality of circumstances). In Kersey, the court held that the
inquiry was error, 525 S.W.2d at 141, but also held that the accompanying Allen
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thus apparently prefer a per se rule because of the potential co-
ercive effect of inquiries and the difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween degrees of coercion in different factual settings. Of these
three jurisdictions, only New Mexico adopts Brasfield as a con-
stitutional rule.27 The remaining states that have considered
the propriety of an inquiry into the numerical division of the
jury28 form two groups. One group permits disclosure of the
numerical division so long as the judge does not ask whether
the majority is for conviction or acquittal.2 9 The courts of the
other group consider the totality of the circumstances, and hold
that even though inquiry into the jury's division is improper, it
is not reversible error in the absence of coercion. 30
Prior to Ellis, only two federal courts had considered the is-
sue of whether the basis of the Brasfield rule is supervisory or
charge was prejudicial error, id. at 145. Although these alternative holdings
were discussed independently, it is not certain that inquiry alone would have
constituted reversible error. For a discussion of Kersey, see 42 TENN. L REV.
803, 811 (1975).
27. State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 97, 547 P.2d 574, 580 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976).
28. Fewer than half the states have considered the Brasfield issue. See
Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 769 (1977).
29. See, e.g., Hardin v. State, 225 Ark. 602, 284 S.W.2d 111 (1955); Wilson v.
State, 145 Ga. App. 315, 244 S.E.2d 355 (1978); State v. Anderson, 247 Minn. 469,
78 N.W.2d 320 (1956); Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591 (Miss. 1976); State v.
Montgomery, 577 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. 1979); Linscomb v. State, 545 P.2d 1272 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1976); State v. Loberg, 73 S.D. 301, 42 N.W.2d 199 (1950). Cases are
collected in Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 769, 780-84 (1977). Cf. Huffaker v. State, 119 Ga.
App. 742, 168 S.E.2d 895 (1969) (absent other evidence of prejudice, inquiry not
reversible error even when jury volunteered the information as to the number
voting guilty or innocent).
Three states of this group have interpreted Brasfield as imposing a federal
rule of procedure rather than a rule grounded in the Constitution, and thus
have specifically declined to follow Brasfield. See Wilson v. State, 145 Ga. App.
315, 324-25, 244 S.E.2d 355, 362 (1978); Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 571, 596 (Miss.
1976); State v. Morris, 476 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. 1971). See also Marsh v. Cupp,
392 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (D. Or. 1975), affid, 536 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S, 981 (1976).
30. See, e.g., State v. Streyar, 119 Ariz. 607, 583 P.2d 263 (1978); People v.
Sellars, 76 Cal. App. 3d 265, 141 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1977); Lowe v. People, 175 Colo.
491, 488 P.2d 559 (1971); People v. Kirk, 76 Ill. App. 3d 459, 394 N.E.2d 1212 (1979);
State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1978); Smith v. Commonwealth, 321
S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1959); State v. Hutchins, 43 N.J. 85, 202 A.2d 678 (1964); State v.
Boogaard, 90 Wash. 2d 737, 585 P.2d 789 (1978). See also Blango v. United
States, 335 A.2d 230 (D.C. 1975); cf. Jenkins v. United States, 330 F.2d 220, 221
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting) (trial judge told the jury, without know-
ing the division, "Now, I am not going to accept this. You have got to reach a
decision in this case."), rev'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) (judge's state-
ment held to be reversible error since coercive "in its context and under all the
circumstances"); Taylor v. State, 17 Md. App. 41, 50, 299 A.2d 841, 845 (1973)
("total conduct of the trial judge" held to violate defendant's constitutional
right to jury trial).
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constitutional. Both of the cases, Marsh v. Cupp3- and Jones v.
Norvell,32 were habeas corpus proceedings arising from state
court convictions. In Marsh, a federal district court held that
the Brasfield rule was based on the supervisory powers of the
Supreme Court.33 In Jones, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the totality of the circumstances had violated
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury
trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 34 The cir-
cumstances in Jones included an invasion of jury secrecy, an
inquiry into the numerical division of the jury, a coercive jury
charge, and a speedy return of a verdict subsequent to the
charge. 35
In Ellis, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered two possible theories under which Ellis' conviction would
have been unconstitutional. The court considered, first,
whether Brasfield establishes a per se constitutional rule
prohibiting inquiry into the numerical division of the jury,36
31. 392 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Or. 1975), affid, 536 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 981 (1976).
32. 472 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir. 1973).
33. 392 F. Supp. at 1063. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision,
but erroneously concluded that no Brasfield issue was presented since the trial
judge had inquired about the numerical standing of the jury but not whether
the jurors favored conviction or acquittal. Hence, the circuit court did not ad-
dress the issue of the basis for the Brasfield rule. See Marsh v. Cupp, 536 F.2d
1287, 1291 n.9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981 (1976).
34. 472 F.2d at 1186.
35. Id.
36. 596 F.2d at 1200. Both the majority and dissent in Ellis assume that if
the federal courts are constitutionally prohibited from inquiring into the nu-
merical division of the jury, this rule also applies to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1197, 1200; id. at 1201 (Win-
ter, J., dissenting). Such an assumption is not necessarily accurate given differ-
ing views of incorporation. Those who adhere to the traditional view of
incorporation believe that when a right is incorporated from the Bill of Rights
into the fourteenth amendment, the guarantee is "to be enforced against the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that
protect those personal rights against federal encroachment." Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964), quoted in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463-64 (1966). Others holding the view that
one writer entitles "neo-incorporation," Cord, Neo-Incorporation: The Burger
Court and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 44 FORDHAM
L. REV. 215 (1975), believe that a procedural right incorporated from the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment may have a different effect on proce-
dures in state criminal cases than the original right has on procedures in fed-
eral criminal prosecutions. Id. at 237-38. Proponents of this position reject the
interpretation that the fourteenth amendment requires following "not only the
Sixth Amendment but all of its bag and baggage, however securely or inse-
curely affixed they may be by law and precedent to federal proceedings."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 213 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring). Justice
White, speaking for the Court, expressed this view in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
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and second, whether the totality of the circumstances, includ-
ing the inquiry into the numerical division of the jury, violated
Ellis' right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process' clause
of the fourteenth amendment.37 In refuting the first possibility,
the court reasoned that Brasfield's reference to avoidance of in-
quiries as "essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the
trial"38 does not compel a constitutional interpretation.3 9 The
court supported its opposition to interpreting Brasfield as a per
se rule by noting that the Brasfield opinion cites no provisions
of the Constitution,40 and that many of the states that have con-
sidered the issue have interpreted Brasfield as an expression
of the Supreme Court's supervisory power.41
In considering the second constitutional challenge, the
court recognized that although the sixth amendment right to an
impartial jury trial has been incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment,42 due process does not re-
quire a state to adopt all the characteristics of a federal jury
trial.43 According to the court, a judicial inquiry into the nu-
merical division of the jury is most closely analogous to the cir-
cumstances in Cupp v. Naughten.44 In that case, in which the
defendant did not testify, the Supreme Court held that the jury
instruction, "Every witness is presumed to speak the truth,"45
U.S. 404, 410-12 (1972), in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359 (1972), and in
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100, 102-03 (1970). These cases held that, in a
state prosecution, neither a unanimous jury nor a jury of twelve is required by
the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Both a twelve-person jury and a
unanimous verdict are required, however, in a federal prosecution. See gener-
ally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrITIONAL LAW § 11-2 (1978); Cord, supra; Hen-
kin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74
(1963).
37. 596 F.2d at 1200. See note 51 infra.
38. 272 U.S. at 450.
39. 596 F.2d at 1197-98. Judge Winter, in his dissent, interpreted the lan-
guage of Brasfield as requiring the opposite result: "If the inquiry it con-
demned 'is coercive' and it is 'essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the
trial' that the inquiry alone be regarded as ground for reversal, I can only con-
clude that Brasfield rests on constitutional grounds." 596 F.2d at 1201 (Winter,
J., dissenting) (quoting Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926)).
40. 596 F.2d at 1197.
41. Id. at 1198. See also text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
42. 596 F.2d at 1199. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); note
36 supra.
43. 596 F.2d at 1199. The Supreme Court has permitted state juries of
fewer than twelve persons, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1979), and verdicts
that are not unanimous, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). The Ellis
dissent attempts to distinguish these cases as "concerned solely with formal as-
pects of the jury." 596 F.2d at 1202 (Winter, J., dissenting).
44. 414 U.S. 141 (1973). See 596 F.2d at 1199-1200.
45. 414 U.S. at 142.
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did not deny due process. 46 Recognizing the constitutional con-
straints placed on federal courts' review of state court convic-
tions, 47 the Ellis court held that the totality of the
circumstances had not violated due process.48
As the majority in Ellis correctly observed,4 9 the Brasfield
opinion is ambiguous on the question of constitutionality. Al-
though the Court's assertion that it is "essential to the fair and
impartial conduct of the trial, that the inquiry itself should be
regarded as ground for reversal" 50 could be interpreted as
based on the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury,5 1
only New Mexico has interpreted that language as requiring a
constitutional rule.52 In contrast, an interpretation of Brasfield
46. Id. at 149-50.
47. 596 F.2d at 1199-1200. The court cites with approval Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), see 596 F.2d at 1200, in which the level of due process
review is "conduct that shocks the conscience." 342 U.S. at 172.
48. 596 F.2d at 1200. The court found that the modified Allen charge in El-
lis was not error, since it was a balanced instruction with no tendency to co-
erce the jury. Id. at 1196-97. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
49. See 596 F.2d at 1197.
50. 272 U.S. at 450.
51. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a...
trial, by an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
Both the majority and the dissent in Ellis incorrectly phrased the constitu-
tional question in terms of fifth amendment due process. 596 F.2d at 1197; id. at
1201 (Winter, J., dissenting). Accepted analysis is that coercion of the jury vio-
lates the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury and the fourteenth amend-
ment guarantee of due process. See, e.g., Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 839
(Alaska 1971) (instruction directing jury to continue deliberations until it ar-
rived at a unanimous verdict held reversible error, since instruction was coer-
cive and thus violated defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and
denied defendant due process); State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15, 22 (Iowa 1978)
(Rawlings, J., dissenting) (inquiry that tends to coerce jurors with minority
views would violate sixth amendment right to an impartial jury). See also
Note, supra note 12, at 136 n.62, 137 n.65. The appellant's brief in Ellis correctly
presented both the inquiry and the Allen charge as issues under the sixth
amendment right to trial by an impartial jury, as applied to the states by the
fourteenth amendment. Brief for Appellant at 6, 18.
The constitutional argument against judicial inquiry has three steps: (1)
judicial inquiry into the numerical division of the jury is coercive; (2) judicial
conduct that coerces minority jurors into agreement deprives the defendant of
his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury; and (3) depriving the defendant
of an impartial jury prevents the fair trial required by due process. Therefore,
judicial inquiry violates due process. The weakness in the logic is the failure of
the initial premise. The language of Brasfield does not say that "the inquiry is
inherently coercive," but only that "in general its tendency is coercive." 272
U.S. at 450. The dissent of Judge Winter exhibited this flaw in reasoning when
he quoted Brasfield in a misleading manner by saying that "the inquiry. . .'is
coercive,"' 596 F.2d at 1201, while the correct quotation should have been that
"in general its tendency is coercive," 272 U.S. at 450. Iowa Supreme Court
Judge Rawlings presented a similar analysis in his dissent in State v. Cornell,
226 N.W.2d 15, 22 (Iowa 1978).
52. State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 97, 547 P.2d 574, 580 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
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as a clarification of the earlier language of Burton v. United
States5 3 suggests that the rule is supervisory rather than con-
stitutional. The Court in Burton stated that an inquiry was in-
consistent with the "proper administration of the law."54
Similarly, in Brasfield, the Court said that an inquiry "affects
the proper relations of the court to the jury."55 Both state-
ments support a supervisory interpretation.5 6 In view of the
conflicting interpretations, the Supreme Court's language in
Brasfield is too ambiguous to characterize the rule definitively
as either constitutional or supervisory.
The Ellis majority and dissent agree that if an inquiry co-
erces the jurors to reach a verdict against their will, the defend-
ant's right to an impartial trial is violated.57 Although it is an
established rule that a judge may not coerce a jury into reach-
ing a verdict, 58 there is disagreement as to what actions have a
coercive effect.5 9 Coercion, in this context, presumably means
that the judicial inquiry causes a minority juror to substitute
the majority's opinion for his own-not that he is persuaded to
agree to a different decision, but that he submits to the major-
ity view in spite of his own opinion of the defendant's guilt or
innocence.
The per se nature of the Brasfield rule suggests that the in-
quiry itself has a coercive effect.60 Indeed, the cases distin-
guish between asking the division and merely knowing the
89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976). Judge Winter, dissenting in Ellis, reached a
similar conclusion. See note 39 supra.
53. 196 U.S. 293 (1905). See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
54. "[W]e do not think that the proper administration of the law requires
such knowledge or permits such a question on the part of the presiding judge."
196 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added).
55. 272 U.S. at 450.
56. Judge Kilkenny suggested the latter interpretation in his dissenting
opinion in United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
57. 596 F.2d at 1199; id. at 1202 (Winter, J., dissenting).
58. "To compel a jury to agree upon a verdict is a denial of a fair and im-
partial jury trial, and, hence is a denial of due process." Mills v. Tinsley, 314
F.2d 311, 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 847 (1963). See also United States
v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 n.20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
59. Early cases involved physical coercion and restraint. People v. Shel-
don, 156 N.Y. 268, 50 N.E. 840 (1898), presents an interesting summary of the co-
ercive methods that nineteenth century trial judges used to obtain unanimous
verdicts. Milder forms of physical coercion persisted into this century. See
cases cited in Note, supra note 12, at 123 n.3. Modem forms of coercion are
more subtle. For a discussion of the possibly coercive effects of an Allen
charge, see Note, The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 Am. CRim. L REv. 637, 655-62
(1972).
60. The Michigan Supreme Court, in adhering to Brasfield, reasoned that
the inquiry "has the doubly coercive effect of melting the resistance of the mi-
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division: no coercion occurs if the jury voluntarily discloses its
numerical division to the judge.6 1 The danger of coercion pre-
sumably exists because jurors tend to view the judge as a per-
son of authority, and thus are likely to be influenced by his
actions during the trial.62 An individual juror might believe
that the judge's inquiry into the division reflects a desire that
the jury reach a verdict. The juror may then feelthat he should
change his vote in order to conform with his perception of the
judge's wishes.
The inquiry, however, seems potentially less coercive than
an Allen charge.63 An Allen charge typically reminds the jury
of the cost in time and money of a retrial, should it be neces-
sary, and of the jurors' duty to try to reconcile their differences
and reach a verdict, if possible, without surrendering their con-
scientious -convictions.64 Such a supplemental instruction has a
much greater potential for coercing a juror than merely asking'
how the jury is numerically divided. Despite fierce criticism,65
nority and freezing the determination of the majority." People v. Wilson, 390
Mich. 689, 692, 213 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1973).
61. See cases cited in note 23 supra; Smoot v. State, 31 Md. 138, 150, 355
A.2d 495, 502 (1976); Commonwealth v. Long, 118 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 363, 179 A.
806, 808 (1935). Contra, Gidley v. State, 19 Ala. App. 113, 114, 95 So. 330, 330
(1923).
62. See Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 741 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 958 (1966) (Coleman, J., concurring) ("It is obvious that under any sys-
tem of jury trials the influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and
properly of great weight, and that his lightest word or intimation is received
with deference, and may prove controlling.") (quoting Starr v. United States,
153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894)). See also Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 758-59
(5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting); Taylor v. State, 17 Md. App. 41, 44, 299
A.2d 841, 844 (1973).
63. Judge Kilkenny makes this argument persuasively in his dissenting
opinion in United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
64. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
65. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MIINIHU STANDARDS FOR CRMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4, at 145-56 (Approved Draft, 1968);
Note, The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47
N.Y.U. L. REv. 296 (1972); Comment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Criti-
cal Look at the "Allen Charge," 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 386 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Chicago Comment]. The Allen charge is generally thought to be on the
outer limits of permissibility. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348, 354
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852,
854 (5th Cir. 1962); Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1961); Comment, Instructing
Deadlocked Juries: The Present Status of the Allen Charge, 3 TEx. TECH L. REv.
313, 315 (1972); Note, supra note 12, at 134, Comment, Bombshell Instruction for
Deadlocked Juries: ABA Standard Replaces Allen Charge in District of Colum-
bia, 13 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 672, 673 (1972). But see Comment, On Instructing




however, Allen charges have never been ruled unconstitutional
by a federal court.66 If Allen charges are constitutionally per-
missible, inquiries must a fortiori also be permitted.
In suggesting that an inquiry is "essentially procedural in
nature"67 and that, "[iin any event, the jury knew how it was
divided,"68 the Ellis court appeared to doubt that judicial in-
quiries have any coercive effect at all. In fact, the difficulty of
imagining a minority juror interpreting a mere inquiry as judi-
cial pressure to change his vote suggests that inquiries might
not have a coercive effect. The judicial conduct that courts
have generally found to be coercive in other contexts is con-
duct giving jurors the impression that they must reach a ver-
dict.69 Since an inquiry lacks that degree of compulsion, there
is apparently no reason to treat cases in which the judge in-
quires into the division differently from those cases in which
66. The Supreme Court most recently allowed an Allen charge in
Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 744 (1952) (holding that alleged error
was insubstantial or adequately addressed by circuit court), affig 190 F.2d 506,
521-28 (9th Cir. 1951). At least one state has held the Allen charge unconstitu-
tional. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 335-37, 275 A.2d 299, 303-09
(1971). For a discussion of the constitutionality of an Allen charge, see State v.
Marsh, 260 Or. 416, 431-32, 490 P.2d 491, 498, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 974 (1971), and
authorities cited therein. See also Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 177 (1965). For a discus-
sion of the weakness of the arguments for unconstitutionality, see Note, Sup-
plemental Jury Charges Urging a Verdict-The Answer is Yet to be Found, 56
MNN. L- REV. 1199, 1221-24 (1972).
Several courts have recently used their supervisory powers to prohibit the
use of the Allen charge. See, e.g., United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879, 883 (7th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184-87 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 419-20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
837 (1969); Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 835-43 (Alaska 1971); People v. Gainer,
19 Cal. 3d 835, 842-52, 566 P.2d 997, 1000-07, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 864-70 (1977); Peo-
ple v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 71-77, 289 N.E.2d 601, 607-10 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
918 (1973); State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d 639, 641-44 (La. 1975); People v. Sulli-
van, 392 Mich. 324, 341-42, 220 N.W.2d 441, 449-50 (1974); State v. Martin, 297
Minn. 359, 366-73, 211 N.W.2d 765, 768-73 (1973).
67. 596 F.2d at 1200.
68. Id. See also United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1340 (4th Cir.
1970).
69. See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965), rev'g per curiam,
330 F.2d 220, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting) (Judge said to the jury,
without knowing the division, "Now, I am not going to accept this. You have
got to reach a decision in this case."); Lowe v. People, 175 Colo. 491, 493-94, 448
P.2d 559, 560-61 (1971) (Judge implicity authorized one juror to sacrifice his con-
scientious opinions merely for the sake of reaching agreement.); Taylor v.
State, 17 Md. App. 41, 44, 299 A.2d 841, 844 (1973) (Judge, after learning that divi-
sion was eleven to one, continued to inquire of each juror concerning the
probability of agreeing. When one juror commented, "It's up to the [one]," the
judge replied, "I agree. It's up to the one to change."); State v. Boogaard, 90
Wash. 2d 733, 735-38, 585 P.2d 789, 791-93 (1978) (Judge, knowing division was
ten to two, inquired of each juror whether or not he believed the jury could
reach a verdict in a half hour.).
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the judge inadvertently learns of the numerical division.7 0
Even if the inquiry does not cause a minority juror to sub-
stitute another opinion for his own, the coercion may neverthe-
less subtly alter the required standard of proof.7 The Supreme
Court has held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment 72 requires the state to prove its case against the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.73 If the judge's inquiry
causes one or more jurors to impermissibly alter this standard,
a subsequent conviction would arguably not be based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court's holding in Cupp v.
Naughten,74 however, suggests that the Brasfield rule against
inquiries does not rise to constitutional dimensions. In Cupp, a
state criminal prosecution in which the defendant neither testi-
fied nor called witnesses on his behalf, the trial judge in-
structed the jury that "[e]very witness is presumed to speak
the truth."75 Although the presumption-of-truthfulness instruc-
tion was considered "confusing, of little positive value to the
jury, or simply undesirable," 76 the Court held that it did not
deny the defendant due process.7 7 The circumstances in Cupp
are remarkably similar to those in Ellis. The trial judge in
Cupp twice gave explicit instructions affirming the presump-
tion of innocence and the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable
70. See Yale Comment, supra note 65, at 133. See also Chicago Comment,
supra note 65, at 392.
71. The minority juror may interpret the judicial inquiry as a reflection of
the judge's belief that the jury should reach a verdict. While a juror does not
interpret this as a command to capitulate to the majority position, he may be-
gin to question his own evaluation. He may reason, "If the judge thinks we
should be agreeing, and rm the one with a differing view, I must have misinter-
preted the judge's instructions. The other jurors must have the correct stan-
dard of proof in mind. Therefore, I will now vote with them."
72. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). What constitutes reasonable
doubt, however, is not clearly defined. See M. SAxs, JuRy VERDICTS 24-27
(1977); Morano, Historical Development of the Interrelationship of Unanimous
Verdicts and Reasonable Doubt, 10 VAT- U.L. REv. 233 (1976); Morano, A Reex-
amination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507
(1975).
74. 414 U.S. 141 (1973). See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
75. Id. at 142. In seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the defendant argued
that such an instruction shifted from the state its burden to prove a defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 143.
76. Id. at 146.
77. Id. at 149-50. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of a writ of habeas
corpus by the court of appeals, after the Court examined the instruction in the
context of the over-all charge. For a discussion of the presumption-of-truthful-
ness instruction, see Comment, Cupp v. Naughten and the Presumption of




doubt,78 and the trial judge in Ellis twice warned the jurors not
to surrender any conscientious beliefs.79 That similarity, as
well as the difficulty of measuring the actual impact on the ju-
ror, suggests that the Ellis inquiry, like the Cupp instruction,
should be considered to violate neither the reasonable doubt
standard nor due process.
The Supreme Court's holding in Apodaca v. Oregon,8O that
unanimous jury verdicts are not constitutionally required,81
may also be logically inconsistent with the argument that Bras-
field is of constitutional dimensions. That holding permits con-
victions even though some jurors remain unconvinced of the
guilt of the defendants. 82 Even if one assumes that a judicial
inquiry actually coerces the minority jurors to acquiesce in a
guilty verdict, such a result is equivalent to allowing a majority
to convict. In both cases, the effect is to reduce the number of
jurors who must agree in order to produce a verdict. There
would appear to be no constitutional difference between con-
victing a defendant when eleven (or fewer) jurors are willing to
vote for conviction and convicting a defendant by a unanimous
verdict when the twelfth juror was persuaded by judicial con-
duct. Thus, even if the inquiry or accompanying circumstances
produce unanimity more rapidly than would occur without the
inquiry, the defendant's constitutional right to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt would appear to be unaffected.8 3
Although the Supreme Court stated in Brasfield that in-
78. 414 U.S. at 147.
79. 596 F.2d at 1196, 1200.
80. 406 U.S. 404 (1972). The companion case is Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356 (1972). Both cases are noted in Recent Developments, Non-Unanimous
Jury Verdicts, 61 GEO. L.J. 223 (1972).
81. See 406 U.S. 404, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (opinion found in
Apodaca's companion case, Johnson v. Louisana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)). Lack ofjury unanimity does not establish reasonable doubt. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. at 362-63.
82. The convictions in Apodaca were by eleven-to-one and ten-to-two ver-
dicts. 406 U.S. at 406. In Johnson the Court upheld a nine-to-three verdict. 406
U.S. at 363.
83. Even in cases in which the procedure plainly violates the defendant's
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has upheld conviction by fashioning
the "harmless-constitutional-error rule." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-
22 (1967). The Court views the harmless-error rule as aiding the goal of state
harmless error statutes: "[to] block setting aside convictions for small errors
or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the
trial." Id. at 22. See FED. R. Cmm. P. 52(a), quoted in note 20 supra. The North
Carolina state rules of criminal procedure contain a codification of the Chap-
man v. California holding "A violation of the defendant's rights under the
Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1443(b) (1978). The Supreme Court followed the harmless error doctrine in a
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quiries are "never useful,"84 many authorities agree with the
view of the Ellis court that "there is some value to the in-
quiry."85 The trial judge must determine when the jury is
deadlocked and a mistrial must be declared.86 A very unequal
jury division may cause ultimate agreement to appear more
probable,8 7 and thus encourage the judge to request further de-
habeas corpus proceeding challenged on fifth and sixth amendment grounds in
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
Judge Kilkenny, dissenting in United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir.
1979), presented a strong argument that FED. R. CRM P. 52(a) on harmless er-
ror has already superseded Brasfield. 594 F.2d at 1305-07 (Kilkenny, J., dissent-
ing). A federal statute also provides support: "On the hearing of any appeal or
writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examina-
tion of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976). The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1946, Order of Feb. 8, 1946, 327 U.S. 825,
and thus were not in existence at the time Brasfield was decided.
84. 272 U.S. at 450. The Court, however, qualified this statement: "Such
procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not
requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division." Id. The Court
did not elaborate on the nature of the alternative questions.
The alternative suggested by the Brasfield court--asking questions that do
not require the jury to reveal its division-would not produce the same kind of
objective information as asking the jury's numerical division. Presumably, the
Court was suggesting that the judge ask the foreman or members of the jury
whether they thought a verdict could be reached. For similar suggested proce-
dures, see People v. Luther, 53 Mich. App. 648, 651, 219 N.W.2d 812, 814 (1974),
affd, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975); State v. Hutchins, 43 N.J. 85, 96, 202
A.2d 678, 684-85 (1964). Even if such an alternative had no coercive effect by it-
self, it would not inform the judge of any fact other than the jurors' opinions,
and the jurors do not have the responsibility of declaring a mistrial. Asking the
jurors whether any progress has been made toward reaching an agreement and
what the likelihood is of future progress, as other courts suggest, see Lowe v.
People, 175 Colo. 491, 495-96, 488 P.2d 559, 561 (1971); Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d
139, 141 (Tenn. 1975), has similar limitations. The only jurors who are likely to
know the possibility of agreement are the minority jurors, and singling them
out for questioning seems coercive.
85. 596 F.2d at 1200. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435-36
(4th Cir. 1961); People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 815, 442 P.2d 353, 356, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 300 (1968); Huffaker v. State, 119 Ga. App. 742, 743, 168 S.E.2d 895, 897
(1969); Linscomb v. State, 545 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976); Joyner v.
State, 484 P.2d 560, 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Yale Comment, supra note 65,
at 132-33; 76 U. PA. L. REv. 622, 622-23 (1928); 3 VAND. L. REV. 123, 124 (1950).
86. Mills v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311, 314 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 847
(1963).
87. Knowledge of the division may help the judge determine the likelihood
of agreement of the jurors under two different group decision theories. Accord-
ing to the tipping point theory, there is a certain critical size of coalition such
that a majority greater than that size will usually be able to overcome the mi-
nority's resistance, while one less than the critical size will normally fail to do
so. Yale Comment, supra note 65, at 110-19. Although the precise location of
the tipping point is difficult to specify, one researcher suggests that majorities
of eight or nine jurors may be the critical size. C. Hawkins, Interaction & Coali-
tion Realignments in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A Study of Experimental
Jury Deliberations 128 (Aug. 17, 1960) (unpublished doctoral thesis in sociology
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liberations rather than declare a mistrial.88 Inquiries, there-
fore, may serve a legitimate function by assisting the trial judge
in determining the advisability of discharging the jury.89
Since inquiries by themselves are not harmful 0 and are
perhaps even helpful,9 1 the Ellis court was correct in finding no
per se constitutional prohibition of judicial inquiries. This does
not mean, however, that an inquiry could not offend due proc-
ess in a particular situation. To determine the probable impact
of an inquiry, the reviewing court must apply a totality-of-the-
circumstances test and examine all relevant circumstances.
The typical case in which a judge inquires into the numerical
division of a deadlocked jury will likely include, as did Ellis, an
Allen charge in the supplemental instruction. The court in El-
lis considered the supplemental charge to be acceptable since
it was a balanced instruction that had no tendency to coerce
the jury.92 Given this relatively mild Allen charge, the court
was clearly correct in concluding that the incremental effect of
the judicial inquiry was negligible. The court's summary appli-
cation 93 of the totality-of-the-circumstances test, however, be-
on file at the University of Chicago Library), cited in Yale Comment, supra
note 65, at 117 n.66. An opposing theory suggests that the influence of the ma-
jority is strictly proportional to its size. See Davis, Group Decision and Social
Interaction" A Theory of Social Decision Schemes, 80 PSYCH. REv. 97, 106 (1973).
See also Williams v. Florida, 339 U.S. 78, 101 n.49 (1970). Whichever theory the
judge espouses, knowledge of the numerical division is useful. For a general
discussion of the judge's relation to deadlocked juries, see Yale Comment,
supra note 65.
88. For a discussion of the frequency of hung juries, see H. KALVEN & H.
ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56-57 (1966); Flynn, Does Justice Fail When the
Jury is Deadlocked?, 61 JUDICATrME 129, 130 (1977).
89. Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976). The usefulness of
knowing the division may be weakened since the trial judge does not know the
original division of the jury. Kalven and Zeisel, in the Chicago Jury Project,
discovered that juries with an overwhelming majority in either direction on the
first ballot were not likely to remain divided. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra
note 88, at 462, Table 127. The first vote must reveal a "massive minority" of
four or five jurors in order to develop the likelihood of a hung jury. Id. at 462.
Though this minority may dwindle during deliberations, "for one or two jurors
to hold out to the end, it would appear necessary that they had companionship
at the beginning of the deliberations." Id. at 463. Thus, the numerical division
of the jury at a time later than the initial ballot may not accurately reflect the
likelihood of a hung jury.
90. See text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 85-89 supra.
92. 596 F.2d at 1196-97. Noting that the judge twice emphasized that no ju-
ror should surrender any conscientious convictions, id. at 1196, the court found
that such a "calmly dispassionate balanced effort on the part of a [federal] trial
judge to induce a verdict does not seem to us to invade the province of the
jury." Id. (quoting United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1341-42 (4th Cir.
1970)) (bracketed language added in Ellis).
93. 596 F.2d at 1200.
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lies the importance of this examination. Although a judicial
inquiry by itself is permissible, there remains the possibility
that due process will be violated when the inquiry is combined
with other circumstances.
The conclusion that the Brasfield rule is not of constitu-
tional dimension leaves unresolved the issue of what appropri-
ate measures a state court may follow in determining the status
of jury deliberations. Since a state need not adhere to a rule
promulgated through the Supreme Court's supervisory power
over the federal courts,9 4 states remain free to determine their
own policy on the use of judicial inquiries95 if the policy meets
the constitutional requirement that the conduct is not coercive
in the totality of the circumstances. 96
94. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). See Hill, supra note 18, at
193. The arguments that favor a supervisory interpretation of the Brasfield
rule, especially the Supreme Court's recent holdings that analogous situations
present no constitutional difficulty, see text accompanying notes 74-83 supra,
suggest that if the issue in Brasfield were to come before the Court today, the
Court would not consider such inquiries to be unconstitutional. See notes 20,
83 supra.
95. One proposal gaining rapid acceptance is stated in section 5.4 of AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JuRY (1974). The ABA standard formulates a
recommended instruction to replace the Allen charge and makes no mention of
inquiry into the division as a means for dealing with a deadlocked jury.
96. See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) (per curiam).
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